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In this short article, I restate what has been my general approach regarding the deﬁnition
of genocide over the past decade. I also try to explain why I have become more ﬂexible
about its deﬁnition, particularly in light of my experience with the global publication
Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence (OEMV) which was founded in 2004.1 This project
was initiated in 2004 by Sciences Po Paris (Center for International Research Studies). It
has taken us nearly four years to get the OEMV ready to be put online. Considering the
highly sensitive nature of this project and the relative novelty of this ﬁeld of research,
this maturation period has proved valuable. The gradual construction of this Web site is
the result of genuine teamwork on the part of computer specialists and researchers, who
endeavored to coordinate technical, scientiﬁc, and ethical criteria.
There’s no doubt that the term “genocide” has generated passion and misunder-
standing since its creation. Indeed, since the United Nations adopted the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) on 9 December
1948,2 genocide has come to mean absolute evil: mass atrocities against defenseless civi-
lians. Coined in 1944 by the Polish jurist Raphael Lemkin, the term has gained increas-
ing international acceptance. Thus, one has talked about genocide in almost every
major deadly conﬂict of the second half of the twentieth century from Cambodia to
Darfur, including Burundi, Rwanda, Guatemala, Colombia, Iraq, Bosnia, Chechnya,
Argentina, and Ethiopia.
The term has also been used retrospectively to qualify the massacre of the inhabi-
tants of Melos by the Greeks (ﬁfth century BCE), the Vendée people in 1793 by the
French revolutionary army, the native people in North America, and the Armenians in
1915 as well as the cases of famine in Ukraine, the various deportations of populations
by Stalin, and of course, the extermination of European Jews and Roma. It has even
been applied to the US nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This list is by no
means exhaustive.
Applying this “genocide” notion to these very heterogeneous historical situations
has generated many objections and passionate debates. These numerous handlings of
the concept suggest the need to resort to a word of universal signiﬁcance to point out a
major phenomenon in the twentieth century—that of the mass destruction of civilian
populations. Other terms have, in fact, been suggested, such as “politicide” proposed by
Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr and “democide” proposed by Rudolph Rummel.3 But these
alternative notions have no legal recognition and thus the word genocide continues to
dominate the ﬁeld.
The ﬁrst problem arising from the word genocide has to do with its various uses. It
has a role in various kinds of political, identity-driven, or humanitarian rhetoric. This is
a full-ﬂedged matter of research and its several uses reveal some issues of great signiﬁ-
cance. I have tried to identify the main ones.
Issues of memory. When a population has been killed on a mass scale, the survival
community sometimes struggles to have this past suffering recognized as genocide. The
most emblematic ﬁght in this ﬁeld is that of the Armenian community in the face of
aggressive denial by the Turkish government and its supporters around the world. But
there are numerous other cases as well. Very often, activist or nationalist leaders put
moral pressure on historians to recognize their individual cases as genocide. If such
scholars are convinced that the case constitutes genocide, they can conduct their
research without any obstacles. If they are not convinced, they might have problems get-
ting access to archives or testimonies. Scholars might also be blamed by survivors who
absolutely want their suffering to be recognized as genocide. In sum, keeping distance
from memory issues and political pressures is a very difﬁcult task in the ﬁeld of genocide
research. This does not mean that scholarly works inspired by memorial issues are nec-
essarily biased and controversial. On the contrary, some such works can constitute some
of the best research, especially when they are focused on what are referred to as “forgot-
ten genocides,” which have been studied less.4 At the OEMV we require each contributor
writing up a case study to distinguish between “memory issues” and “interpretation of
facts.”
Urging humanitarian action. This occurs when non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) report that a population is in danger of genocide. In such cases, using the word
“genocide” aims to prompt public concern that will lead to an international intervention.
This can also lead to an overuse of the word to convince state decision makers of the
desperate nature of a crisis and/or to act decisively. That, of course, can be counterpro-
ductive. Indeed, if genocide is already underway in a particular country, state decision
makers can reply that there is nothing that can be done because it is too late. Thus,
instead of spurring action, the use of the word genocide leads to no action at all, to pas-
sivity. For this reason US legal expert David Scheffer has recommended the use of the
term “mass atrocities” instead of “genocide” in cases when NGOs want to convince the
international community to take action. Paradoxically, this expression is less frightening
than the “G” word, which is why some academic programs are now titled Genocide and
Mass Atrocities Studies. It should be kept in mind that this approach to the concept of
mass atrocity is a practical step to maneuver through the political realities that are obsta-
cles to human rights intervention against mass violence, not a genuine conceptual shift.
Legal purposes. When prosecuting instigators and perpetrators, such as Pinochet
or Milošević, for the crime of genocide, prosecutors and judges use the wording of the
UNCG, by which the International Criminal Court (ICC) abides. But it is not certain
that use of the charge of genocide for prosecution is appropriate in all cases. Darfur is a
good example of this: for some analysts and organizations it was a real case of genocide
but for others (such as the French NGO Médecins Sans Frontières) it was not. However,
this position did not prevent those concerned about the mass violence in Darfur from
being deeply engaged in trying to help the people of Darfur. ICC President Luis Moreno-
Ocampo’s decision to prosecute Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, for genocide
has surprised those who believe that Khartoum was more responsible for ethnic cleans-
ing, which can be qualiﬁed more as a crime of war or crime against humanity (as the
legal expert Antonio Cassese argued in his report for the UN), than genocide. In that
regard, one can argue that the ICC might contribute to the banalization of the word
genocide.
Last but not least, the term can also be used as a moral and psychological weapon
against one’s enemy. For example, the Serbs of Kosovo claimed to be the victims of a
new genocide by the Albanians since the middle of the 1980s, while delegates of the
Conference of Durban in 2001 accused Israel of perpetrating a “real” genocide against
the Palestinian people. As a result, the word is sometimes used as a symbolic shield to
construct the identity of the victim, just as a sword is drawn against an enemy.
Can we hope for some clariﬁcations from the research community? Not really. The
range of deﬁnitions is very wide, from Israel Charny who thinks that any massacre is
genocide (including the nuclear accident at Chernobyl) to Steven Katz who asserts that
only one genocide has been perpetrated in history: the one against the Jews. Fortunately,
some Holocaust scholars, such as Omer Bartov and Yehuda Bauer, have developed a dif-
ferent point of view and have demonstrated that they are open to comparative analysis
with other cases of genocide.
Obviously, there is no consensus among scholars about what does and what does
not constitute genocide. This ﬁeld of research might appear as both confused and highly
subject to political and memorial controversies even if researchers are doing their best
to produce a high level of scholarly work. Considering that discussion around the
G word is endless and above all leads nowhere, some eminent colleagues such as Chris-
tian Gerlach now reject the G word, advocating instead alternative expressions, such as
“extremely violent society.”5
On a different but certainly related note, let me underline the fact that our aca-
demic and digital initiative, our OEMV, represents a unique effort to gather together
the most important historical cases of mass human destruction while honoring their
singularity, thus offering a way to compare them according to the same framework of
analysis. It aims to build a strong body of knowledge beyond these controversies thanks
to the fact that we are following a rigorous methodology set out in our guidelines. So far
so good; none of the contributions available online have provoked any major objection.
Beyond this, is it possible to bring some clariﬁcation to this new ﬁeld of research?
In this regard, I wish to raise three key questions/issues.
1. What is at stake in our relationship with relevant international law (i.e., the
UNCG)? We can identify at least two schools of thought among genocide scholars.
First, there is what I call the UN school of genocide scholars. Most scholars come
from this school and believe that the UNCG offers the most useable deﬁnition precisely
because the scholarly community is unable to agree on a common deﬁnition of geno-
cide. They also believe that it is legitimate to make use of the legal deﬁnition as a
research category in social sciences. To some extent, they are right since this was Lem-
kin’s position in his book.6 He did not intend to dissociate the historical analysis of
such bloody events from its legal incrimination. But Lemkin was an international legal
expert. Does his position have to be shared by historians and political scientists?
This UN school of genocide scholars has been challenged by a new generation of
scholars who want to distance the ﬁeld from the UN legal deﬁnition. Essentially, they
ask, To what extent is it legitimate to take an international legal norm, based on a politi-
cal agreement by the international community in 1948, as an operational basis for our
research in history, sociology, anthropology? To do so means that we base our genocide
research on an international norm which is by deﬁnition political since the text of the
UNCG is clearly the outcome of an international agreement reached by the world com-
munity of states within the post-war context.
Such a concern is why scholars of the new generation want to rely ﬁrst and fore-
most on their discipline (i.e., history, sociology, political science, anthropology) in their
genocide research. They certainly take into account the legal deﬁnition but they do not
want to be bound by it.
There is another basis for using alternatives to the UN deﬁnition: the need for an
interdisciplinary approach. Genocide as a phenomenon in itself is so complex that it
must be examined not only from the standpoint of the historian but also from that of
the psychologist, the anthropologist, and so forth. Interdisciplinary analysis is absolutely
necessary if we really want to study such monstrous events in-depth. Inspired by Chris-
topher Browning’s work, this is the basic argument of my book Purify and Destroy.7
2. There is a second important difference among scholars regarding the scope of the
events that they deﬁne as genocide. For numerous scholars, especially in North
America and the UK, genocide and massacre mean more or less the same thing. A
recent example of this is found in Martin Shaw’s work.8 According to Shaw, any
kind of killing of an unarmed group might be regarded as genocide, an idea that
lead him to support a controversial position when he recently stated that Israel
committed genocide in 1948 against the Palestinian people. Bartov strongly dis-
agreed with him in calling this expulsion of Palestinian people a genocide.9 Ulti-
mately, they both agreed that some form of what is now called ethnic cleansing did
occur in 1948. But whereas Bartov was not willing to think of this as genocide,
Shaw conﬁdently argued that any policy meant to destroy a group, even if it is not
outright murder, should be seen as genocide.
I, too, disagree with Shaw’s assertion that any massacre constitutes a form of geno-
cide. This overuse of the G word leads to its abuse.
Being aware of this, some scholars use the expression “genocidal massacre.” But this
notion is rather confusing in itself. Here, as scholars, we should distance ourselves from
the G word to study “massacre” as such as an independent object of research. (A new book
co-edited by Lyndall Ryan and Philip Dwyer is an important and fruitful contribution in
that direction.10) Thus, it is legitimate to study the multicausal process, which can lead a
country from massacre to genocide without pre-supposing any kind of determinism, the
road to mass killing and genocide being circuitous. I have defended the idea that not
every massacre can be considered genocide and genocide is composed of one or more
massacres. In other words, we need to study the genocidal process—that is, the process
moving from massacre to genocide, as suggested by Leo Kuper back in the early 1980s.
Still, it should be understood that my criticism about the overuse of the word genocide
does not mean that I reject the term itself. At the end of Purify and Destroy, I ﬁnally
present my own deﬁnition of genocide from a social scientiﬁc point of view: “[Genocide
is] a particular process of civilian destruction that is directed at the total eradication of a
group, the criteria by which it is identiﬁed being determined by the perpetrator.”11
3. The notion of the crime of genocide as deﬁned in the UNCG is not comprehensive
enough to be applied to the different historical processes of mass destruction to
which scholars try to stretch it to cover. Instead of modifying its contents, why not
have another complementary UNCG to focus on the notion of crime against
humanity? It will be very helpful in clarifying many debates on legal/social scientiﬁc
deﬁnitions and enriching the legal weapons to prosecute instigators and perpetra-
tors of such crimes. In that regard, the Crimes Against Humanity Initiative,
an international initiative currently led by Leilha Sadat (Washington University of
St. Louis) and supported by William Schabas and many other international lawyers,
is exactly what is needed today. The results of my own work have led me in that
direction as well, even if I am not a legal expert.
Let us start again with the 1948 UN deﬁnition of genocide. We all know that geno-
cide is deﬁned through the intent to destroy a group as a whole or in part.12 But the UN
text does not specify the political goals of such intent. As a historian and political scien-
tist, it seems important to me to draw a distinction between two processes of mass
destruction:
Destroying to subjugate. The goal here is to annihilate a group partly in order to
force the rest of the group into total submission. The destruction process is, by deﬁni-
tion, partial but it is intended to have an overall impact on the rest of the group. In legal
terms, I understand that this can be described as a crime against humanity.
Destroying to eradicate. Genocide aims not so much to subjugate individuals tied
to a given political power but rather to eliminate a community from a more or less
extensive territory controlled or coveted by a state. This process involves “cleansing” or
“purifying” the area of the presence of another who is deemed undesirable and/or dan-
gerous. For this reason, the concept of eradication seems particularly relevant since its
etymology conveys the idea of severing roots or extracting from the earth—in short “up-
rooting”—as would be said of a harmful plant or contagious disease. In legal terms, the
UN deﬁnition of genocide is closely linked to this particular process of mass destruction.
These two processes often overlap in the same historical situation. In Rwanda, for
example, Hutu extremists tried to eradicate the Tutsi minority while suppressing mod-
erate Hutu. In the former Soviet Union under Stalin, these two processes of destruction
were also at work. While the general aim of the communist power was to subjugate all
Soviet people, Stalin’s policy was to eradicate particular groups or nations perceived as
enemies of his regime. If he had ever been brought to trial, Stalin might have been pro-
secuted for having perpetrated both genocide and crimes against humanity.
If we look at the ﬁeld of genocide research as a whole, what a mess! I hope that
these comments can help bring about some clariﬁcations, but I doubt it. Individual
scholars have their own genocide deﬁnitions in mind to apply to their personal historical
cases to which they have dedicated their lives. For these reasons, and primarily because
they are dedicated to speaking in the name of the dead, scholars are generally not at all
ﬂexible or ready to make any concessions. We all know scholars who specialize in a par-
ticular sub-ﬁeld and no longer speak to other specialists within the same sub-ﬁeld
because they strongly disagree in their respective approaches. This is one of the reasons
why our OEMV has opted for the more neutral and general term “mass violence.”
However, we do not reject the notion of genocide. Our “Scientiﬁc Approach”
explains,
Nonetheless, the incrimination of genocide remains relevant in view of the UNCG. Un-
doubtedly, and in spite of its ambiguity, this document represents a fundamental contri-
bution by international lawyers. It bears witness to the emergence of a universal
conscience opposing the outrageousness of mass crimes. Indeed, the UNCG appears all
the more important since social scientists have been unable to agree on a common deﬁ-
nition of genocide. Shedding light on their different approaches is among the main ob-
jectives of the OEMV.13
With respect to my own deﬁnition of genocide, I do not pretend to convince any-
body else that it is the deﬁnition to which all should adhere. This leads me to be more
tolerant of what does and what does not constitute genocide. What is really at stake is
understanding why and how a society can slide into mass violence and mass destruc-
tion. This is exactly what Purify and Destroy is about. But that is another story.
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